The Court missed a pivotal opportunity to affirm the positive duties incumbent upon member states to prevent, investigate, and redress such infringements. This judicial omission not only weakens the normative framework for the protection of religious liberty but also risks entrenching impunity, especially where vulnerable groups—such as religious minorities or female spiritual leaders—are systematically subjected to discrimination, violence, or exclusion.
In the case of Priestess Lovina Adonor v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (ECW/CCJ/JUD /02/2025, the plaintiff, Priestess Lovina Amina Adonor, a Nigerian citizen and a priestess, brought claims against the Nigerian government alleging violations of her fundamental human rights. Specifically, she contended that her shrine was attacked and vandalized by private individuals, which forced her to flee her community due to threats against her life. She argued that the Nigerian authorities failed to provide adequate protection, investigate her complaints, or address the destruction of her religious materials and property. These allegations were framed as violations of her rights to propagate her religion, to security, and to own property without discrimination. The rights violation arising in this case includes the right to propagate her religion, right to personal security, right to own property without discrimination and the right to fair hearing and access to justice. The plaintiff alleged that the State failed to protect her and her shrine. Further, they failed to prosecute or take meaningful legal steps towards redressing her complaints and regrettably mischaracterized her fundamental rights case as a civil matter. The exhibits relied on by the plaintiff includes petitions to commissioner of police and ministry of tourism, photos of her coronation and community events, photos of dead animals and damaged property, receipts for spiritual items and her trado-medical license.
The reliefs sought by the Applicant, includes a declaration that the illegal takeover and destruction of the Applicant’s workshop, office equipment, building, and livestock constituted an infringement of her property rights as guaranteed under Section 43 of the 1999 Constitution. She also sought a declaration that the Respondent’s failure to investigate the destruction of her property amounted to a violation of her right to security, contrary to relecvant laws and treaties.
The key legal issue before the ECOWAS Court was whether the Plaintiff’s rights to freedom of religion, personal security, and property were violated as a result of the Defendant’s failure to prevent, protect against, and prosecute the alleged acts of violence and dispossession. Specifically, the Court was invited to determine whether the Nigerian government’s inaction—despite being presented with formal complaints and prima facie evidence of wrongdoing—amounted to a breach of its obligations under both domestic and international human rights frameworks.
Closely tied to this was the broader question of whether the state’s failure to pursue effective investigation and prosecution, thereby creating an environment of impunity, could be construed as constructive complicity or toleration of human rights abuses by non-state actors. In this context, the Court also had to consider whether such omission by the state falls within its adjudicatory competence, particularly under Article 9(4) of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol, which empowers the Court to hear cases alleging violations of human rights committed by member states or their agents. Thus, the case raised critical questions about the scope of state responsibility, the accountability threshold required under regional human rights law, and the ECOWAS Court’s interpretive mandate in holding states to account for both action and inaction in the protection of fundamental rights
Upon a comprehensive review of the parties’ submissions, the ECOWAS Court of Justice, in a judgment delivered on 13 February 2025, dismissed the Applicant’s claims for lack of direct attribution of the alleged human rights violations to the Federal Republic of Nigeria or its agents. The three-member panel—comprising Honourable Justice Ricardo Cláudio Monteiro Gonçalves (Presiding Judge), Honourable Justice Sengu Mohamed Koroma (Judge Rapporteur), and Honourable Justice Edward Amoako Asante—found that the acts complained of were committed by private individuals, and that the Respondent had taken reasonable steps to investigate the allegations, thereby absolving the state of liability. The Court accordingly declined to award reparations or issue a perpetual injunction, holding that each party should bear its own costs.
The Court noted discrepancies in the Applicant’s pleadings, particularly her misidentification of relevant legal provisions. It observed: “In paragraph 1.11 of the Application, the Applicant erroneously cites Article 5 of the African Charter but reproduces the content of Article 6. While the Court may, in appropriate circumstances, invoke the correct legal provision suo motu where the facts and evidence are consistent and non-prejudicial, the present Application is marred by inconsistencies in legal citation and arguments that are grossly at variance with the provisions relied upon. This prevents the Court from exercising its inherent corrective powers.
The ECOWAS Court of Justice was wrong to have held that it cannot rely on non-cited international treaties to support the grant of the applicant’s reliefs. The court can rely on treaties ratified by member states, even if they are not explicitly cited in a complaint. This is based on the Court’s broad mandate to apply international human rights instruments, regardless of whether a complainant references them. See Article 10 of the ECOWAS Court Protocol (1991, amended in 2005). The ECOWAS Court can and does rely on treaties ratified by member states, even if they are not cited in the complaint. This is because the Court has a broad mandate to interpret and apply international human rights instruments, ensuring that justice is served based on substantive human rights principles rather than technical legal arguments. The Court has, in several cases, relied on treaties and international human rights laws that were not explicitly cited in complaints.
Also, the ECOWAS Court can interpret national laws related to human rights. This means that even if a human rights claim is based on a national constitution, if it also violates international treaties like the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the ECOWAS Court can hear the case. The Court does not need a national law to recognize human rights violations; it derives its power from international treaties. It can hear cases involving national laws, including constitutional provisions, as long as they relate to human rights violations under international law. It does not need local laws to enforce human rights, as it relies on treaties ratified by member states. The mere allegation that there has been a violation of human rights in the territory of a member state is sufficient prima facie to justify the jurisdiction of this Court on the dispute, surely without any prejudice to the substance and merits of the Complaint which has to be determined only after the parties have been given the opportunity to present their case with full guarantees of fair trial.
In Opuz v. Turkey (Application No. 33401/02) where the European Court of Human Rights (2009), Nahide Opuz and her mother were repeatedly assaulted and threatened by Opuz’s husband. Despite numerous complaints to the authorities, the state failed to adequately investigate or intervene. Opuz’s mother was eventually killed. The European Court found that Turkey had violated Articles 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court held that Turkey had an obligation to investigate and prevent gender-based violence and ensure adequate legal remedies for victims. In González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico – Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2009), three women bodies were found dead in a cotton field in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. The victims’ families alleged that the Mexican authorities failed to investigate the disappearances and deaths adequately, which was part of a broader pattern of gender-based violence and systemic failure to protect women from violence in the region. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that Mexico had violated the women’s right to life, right to personal integrity, and right to personal liberty, among others. The court emphasized that states have a duty to conduct thorough and effective investigations into gender-based violence and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice. The state was ordered to compensate the families and take measures to prevent further violence against women.
In this instance, the ECOWAS Court effectively abdicated its fundamental responsibility to determine whether interference with religious practice by non-state actors—when met with the state’s conspicuous inaction or dereliction of duty—amounts to a breach of human rights under regional and international legal standards. By refraining from thoroughly adjudicating on the state’s obligation to protect individuals from violations perpetrated by private entities, particularly in matters implicating freedom of religion and belief, the Court missed a pivotal opportunity to affirm the positive duties incumbent upon member states to prevent, investigate, and redress such infringements. This judicial omission not only weakens the normative framework for the protection of religious liberty but also risks entrenching impunity, especially where vulnerable groups—such as religious minorities or female spiritual leaders—are systematically subjected to discrimination, violence, or exclusion. The Court’s reluctance to assert jurisdiction over this dimension of the case signals a troubling retreat from its mandate as a guardian of human rights and a beacon of justice for those marginalized by both state and societal structures.
The impact of this case lies in its potential to test the extent to which the ECOWAS Court of Justice can utilize existing legal frameworks to hold Nigerian authorities accountable for their failure to prosecute cases after a citizen has lodged a complaint, especially in contexts where gender and religion play a significant role. It challenges the culture of impunity that often surrounds such complaints in Nigeria, where victims—particularly women and religious minorities—are frequently denied justice due to systemic bias, inaction, or selective enforcement. By examining whether the regional court can compel state actors to fulfill their prosecutorial obligations, the case could set a precedent for regional oversight in ensuring that national governments do not neglect their duty to protect and enforce the rights of vulnerable populations.
A critical concern emerging from this case is the pervasive institutional bias against women religious leaders, which underscores the broader systemic protection gaps that persist in cases involving female complainants. The entire investigative and prosecutorial chain—from the initial officers assigned to the case through to the senior management team overseeing its trajectory—was composed exclusively of male personnel, thereby raising legitimate questions about the presence of unconscious gender bias and the likelihood of empathetic, nuanced handling of such matters. This gender imbalance not only diminishes the confidence of female victims in the justice system but also risks distorting the course of justice itself. To remedy this, it is imperative to incorporate comprehensive gender studies into the curriculum of police academies and to establish mandatory continuing education modules for justices of the ECOWAS Court. Such training would foster a deeper understanding of gender dynamics, empower judicial and law enforcement personnel to recognize and confront gender-based prejudice, and ultimately enhance institutional capacity to adjudicate gender-sensitive cases with fairness, cultural competence, and respect for human dignity.